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WHAT REAL WORLD?
Philippine Debt, Interest and Exchange 
Rate Policy - and Its Price*
Reginald Herbold Green
Those who will not understand history The Real Worlds of Economic
Are doomed to repeat it. Policy
George Santayana
The negotiation is concluded, 
The boom is fading, 
And we are not saved.
Jeremiah 8:20 adapted to 1992 Philippines
Secretary Jesus Estanislao has been wont to 
attack critics of his economic policies - especially his 
external debt policy - of being balasubaswho did not 
live in the real world He has also challenged them 
to look at history-and shown a penchant for citing 
economic policy and performance in Chile under 
General Pinochet in support of his contentions.
It is but proper to ask: “What real world?” and 
“What lessons from the recent economic history of
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Chile?” The real world is subject to both normative 
and technical interpretations while Chilean eco­
nomic history must be appreciated in light of the 
“Southern Cone" economic strategy.1 Said strategy 
was operated by the so-called ultra Chicago eco­
nomic policy school (less politely termed “the Chi­
cago Cowboys”) and where it led is of direct rele­
vance to these questions.
“Should We Starve Our 
Children to Pay Our Debts?”
Economic policy is in a very real sense a 
branch of applied moral philosophy. Adam Smith 
was a Professor of Moral Philosophy who asserted 
the primacy of "moral economy” on basic issues. In 
particular, he held that no nation could be great and 
prosperous when the majority of its people were 
poor and miserable. He believed that the state had 
a duty to create a facilitating environment so that the 
poor and miserable could win their way out of their 
condition of absolute poverty. He saw efficient, 
competitive enterprise as crucial to that process but 
also saw the latifundistas, the domestic monopolies 
and the transnational corporations of his day, as 
enemies of the moral economy. His comment was 
that they rarely met, even for socialisation and 
conviviality, without conspiring against the common 
good. He was particularly concerned when such 
groups influenced and interacted with the state so 
that policy was used to further their aims. It is 
interesting to consider the applications of this per­
spective to the Makati-Malacanang alliance on 
macroeconomic policy and to the landlord majority 
in the House of Representatives.
On how to handle external debt, one must con­
clude that Adam Smith would have also made 
Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere's famous query to the 
notables of British finance and business. The ques­
tion was whether Tanzania should starve its chil­
dren to pay its external creditors. No one was in any 
doubt that it was intended as a rhetorical question. 
But, under the Secretaries and Governors of the 
Aquino administration, the Philippine government
has not merelyfailed to view the question as rhetori­
cal; it has regularly answered it “yes” . No other 
country in the world has, over this period, done so 
as regularly and even enthusiastically as the Philip­
pines. What real world of moral economy is this?
Debt Reduction - What Is The 
Current Context?
Secretary Estanislao asserts that the Philippine 
external debt management and renegotiation strat­
egy over 1986-91 has been prudent and successful. 
He accuses critics - notably the Senate, the House 
of Representatives, the Freedom from Debt Coali­
tion (FDC), and eminent members of the UP School 
of Economics - of being out of touch with realities.
The strategy and the bargaining have somewhat 
delayed debt principal repayment. They have never 
resulted in deferring interest though. The only sub­
stantial write-offs (50 percent reductions on two 
tranches of commercial bank debt) were pushed by 
the World Bank and IMF on an initially unenthusias- 
tic Philippine Treasury and Central Bank. Even 
then, the Fund and Bank had to intervene to block 
the Philippine's accepting a 30 percent write-down 
instead of holding out for a 50 percent one. Now that 
the Secretary and Governor view the exercise as 
completed, it is clear that the Philippines has, at 
best, secured a 15 percent reduction in the real 
present valueof future debt service payments (inter­
est and principal). Is that a good result?
The Philippines is a lower middle income, debt- 
distressed economy in World Bank categorisation. 
At about $650 per capita national output, it is barely 
above the poor/lower middle breakpoint (and the 
IDA-World Bank soft loan window eligibility line). At 
a realistic peso-dollar exchange rate, it would be 
lower income. The idea that the Philippines is a 
slightly misplaced Latin American middle income 
economy or a slightly lagging Asian high growth 
economy may be flattering, but such classification 
is wrong. Structurally, the Philippines resembles 
poorly performing African ‘ low/lower middle income,
debt weighted-down economies such as the Cote 
d’Ivoire more than it does any other category.
In the mid-1980s, it came to be accepted that both 
moral and applied political economy called for debt 
burden reduction for low-income economies. By 
1989, it appeared realistic to seek a 30 percent to 50 
percent effective debt reduction which, on the then 
trends, looked just negotiable. Such would have 
reduced net debt service (interest and principal 
repayment less new loans plus grants) to just 10 
percent of visible and invisible exports plus workers 
remittances. That 10 percent level was the basic 
objective of the FDC and of the Senate and House 
debt cap bills, passed in 1989 by the Senate and 
1990 by the House, but vetoed.
What is the picture as of the first half of 1992 as 
far as other countries are concerned?
Costa Rica in 1990 received about 67 percent 
write-off in both government (Paris Club) and com­
mercial bank (London Club) debt. Poland and 
Egypt are in the process of receiving 60 percent 
write-downs agreed to in 1991. Late 1991 negotia­
tions have led to a reduction estimated at up to 78 
percent for Nicaragua. Argentine and Brazilian talks 
focus on 30 percent to 40 percent reductions which 
seem likely to be agreed in 1992.
All of these (with the exception of Nicaragua) are 
lower-middle income economies with higher output 
per person than the Philippines. ForPhilippine-type 
economies, the going rate appears to be at least 60 
percent effective reduction by partial write-off of 
principal, longer duration at lower interest rates and/ 
or, provision of new grants de facto to service old 
loans.
If the going rate is 60 percent in the real world of 
early 1990s lower-middle income and debt-dis­
tressed economy negotiations, what is one to make 
of a strategy concluding with 10 percent to 15 
percent reductions? Prudent? For whom? For for­
eign banks, perhaps. For other foreign enterprises
and economies interested in exports and invest­
ment, probably not. For the Philippines, surely not!
To claim the policy as having led to a high secon­
dary market value on Philippine loans - over 50 
percent compared to under 15 percent for the Cote 
d’Ivoire - is true. But why? To whose benefit? In 
order to maintain external debt service the Philip­
pines has crippled the budget, ran down public 
services and infrastructure, and allowed absolute 
poverty to increase. The Philippine negotiators may 
live in a real world but it is the real world of conser­
vative, short-term oriented creditors, not of debtors. 
It is indeed true that in the real world, if a country’s 
own negotiators in fact argue the other side’s case, 
they will get a poor deal.
History, General Pinochet and 
the Cowboys
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chile had a 
distinctive economic strategy. It was deliberately 
designed by the so-called ultra-Chicago sub-school 
of economists. While it lasted, it served foreign and 
domestic economic financial institution’s interests 
very well. It appeared for a time to generate growth, 
end import capacity constraints and underwrite 
using consumption (especially for the upper and 
middle classes). Also practiced under the authori­
tarian military regimes of Argentina and Uruguay, it 
became known as the Southern Cone strategy. The 
Chile of General Pinochet and the “Chicago Cow­
boys” was its locus classicus. It is, as should soon 
become evident, important for the Philippines to 
understand the nature of that strategy and its his­
tory.
The main objectives, instruments and results of 
the strategy can be schematised briefly:
o a fixed, or even slightly appreciating, nominal 
exchange rate with no foreign exchange or 
foreign transactions controls;
o a high (in world terms) real interest rate to pull
4in short term foreign capital via the domestic 
banking system and the enterprise sector in 
general;
o growth and high imports fuelled by capital 
account inflows;
o a relatively conservative fiscal policy (3 
percent to 5 percent of gross domestic output 
accounted for by government borrowing, basi­
cally to cover capital spending on infrastructure 
and to underwrite low personal income and 
enterprise profits taxes);
o consumer, real estate and financial market 
booms;
o moderate but rising inflation (say 6 percent 
creeping up to 15 to 20 percent);
o as another result, rising real overvaluation of 
the currency;
o hampered export growth and competition by 
domestic producers with imports;
o high and rising domestic interest rates to claw 
in foreign funds to cover the rising current 
account deficit and to try to damp down infla­
tion;
o falling long-term productive investment masked 
for a time by property and financial market 
speculative bubbles;
o in four to six years, a rapidly escalating exter­
nal loss of confidence, a reversal of capital 
flows (with no exchange control instruments to 
limit it), a collapse of import capacity, drastic 
falls in production and rises in unemployment, 
spiralling devaluation and inflation;
o collapse of the real estate/financial bubbles, 
bankruptcy of about 90 percent of domestic 
banks and associated company empires and of 
many other large enterprises which had bor­
rowed abroad; and
o three to five years of depression.
We need to understand that history is very simple. 
Philippine macroeconomic policy over 1989-92 has 
looked increasingly “Southern Cone” in nature. That 
this appears to be instinctive and unconsidered is 
not of much consolation as 1990 to 1991 Philippines 
appears to be characterized by (a) rising exchange 
rate overvaluation, (b) rising real interest rates, (c) 
growing depression of long-term directly productive 
fixed investment in favour of property and financial 
market speculative booms, (d) rising external ac­
count deficits plugged by foreign fund inflows not 
appearing on official external debt balance sheets, 
and (e) fal+ering growth. These can only have been 
exacerbated by the 1992 election boom with public 
works slush funds, campaign vote buying, and 
foreign campaign support bolstering import capac­
ity and propping up the increasingly overvalued 
peso. Consumption is up, the exchange rate has 
appreciated even nominally from substantial late 
1991 overvaluation, the properly and financial bub­
bles expand further. But where next?
Overvaluation, Trade 
Liberalisation and Export-Led 
Growth?
Over 1986-89 the Philippine peso moved from 
moderately large to moderately small overvalu­
ation. When it stood at P30 = $1 (after the Middle 
East war oil price, world economic slowdown and 
remittance shocks), it was probably 10 to 15 percent 
overvalued, i.e. P33to P35 would have been sounder 
in terms of export profitability and import competi­
tiveness. Since then, Philippine inflation has aver­
aged over 15 percent - rising to 20 percent, suppos­
edly falling to 10 percent and in the past few months 
accelerating again under drought and election spend­
ing stimuli. But instead of declining to P40 to P45 to 
$1 at the end of 1991 and perhaps P50 = $1 as of 
mid-1992 it appreciated to under P25 = $1 and then
remained in the 25 to 27 peso to the dollar range. 
That is approaching 100 percent overvaluation, 
quite possibly the worst in Philippine history. Cer­
tainly 100 percent or even 60 percent overvaluation 
is a crippling deterrent both to export production and 
to domestic market production competing with im­
ports.
Philippine economic strategy is keyed to reducing 
barriers to imports (and especially prohibitions or 
quotas) and to export-led growth. It is clear that 
overvaluation is inconsistent with both. This contra­
diction (very literally antagonistic contradiction) is 
only worsened by the high real interest rates needed 
to suck in external funds to bridge the growing trade 
gap (and interest bill) and to attempt to choke down 
inflation. Fifteen (15) to 20 percent real interest 
rates to enterprises are neither consistent with 
present profitability nor with the long-term invest­
ment needed in production and infrastructure ca­
pacity. The 1986-90 growth generated largely by 
recovery and re-utilization of existing capacity idled 
during the 1983-85 slump cannot possibly be sus­
tained.
Overvaluation, high real interest rates, trade liber­
alisation and export-led growth do not constitute a 
paradoxical strategy. They add up to simple non­
sense. That, too, is the real world.
Walking on Water - 
For How Long?
The evident answer to this critique is that the 
strategy does work - output has risen, the overall 
external account is positive judging by exchange 
rate and reserve movements. To the first, the 
answer is that it all depends on what one means. 
Beginning in 1983 before the economic crises of the 
terminal years of the Marcos regime, average an­
nual growth through 1991 has been under 2.5 
percent (but with negative per person real growth). 
The period from 1986 to 1989 in retrospect was a 
simple recovery fuelled by higher private and public
spending and made possible by less unsatisfactory 
capital account flows. It was not a genuine invest­
ment-underpinned development process start-up. 
The construction/property speculation boom (espe­
cially in Metro Manila, Cebu City and Davao) plus 
the standard pre-election boom have masked what 
may well be a 1991 -92 decline - at best stagnation 
- in more basic sectors of the economy.
Theexternalbalancedynamicsare more interest­
ing intellectually, but no less alarming practically. 
From 1989 the actual external balance position has 
increasingly out-performed the projected but also 
what can be accounted for on known magnitudes. 
By 1991, the discrepancy seems to have been in the 
order of $5,000 million. The official explanation has 
been the very high growth of invisible exports and 
that remittances of overseas workers rose 75 to 100 
percent after 1989. Is that plausible?
Tourism actually fell in real terms in 1990-91 as a 
result of the Gulf War and Northern recession. Base 
purchases and employment assuredly did not grow 
rapidly even pre-Pinatubo; it fell afterward even 
before the Senate’s decision to reject the continued 
occupation agreement. The Gulf War, (particularly 
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait) and the continuing 
slump in the world maritime industry certainly re­
duced total Filipino overseas workers in 1990-91. 
Inflation offset the real contractions in nominal 
dollar terms but there is no way it could have led to 
a 75 to 100 percent increase in any of the three key 
categories, let alone in all three.
•
The dominant true explanation is fairly evident - 
unrecorded, largely short-to medium-term external 
financial flows largely of a debt nature but not 
recorded on official external debt accounts. By the 
end of 1991, these probably were of the cumulative 
order of $20,000 to $25,000 million - comparable to 
the recorded external debt. The main components 
appear to be:
o short-term net external liabilities of domestic 
banks - $1,000 to $3,000 million;
o dollar-denominated domestic bank accounts - 
$3,000 million;
o peso-denominated foreign-owned accounts 
attracted by high interest rates plus de facto 
free convertibility - $5,000 million or more;
o real estate speculative external investment - 
$5,000 million (probably largely equity but in­
vested on the premise that the property boom 
will continue and the proceeds will be freely 
exchangeable);
o short-term commercial credit (including direct 
company book debts and short-term loans not 
intermediated via a bank) - $5,000 million; and
o loans raised offshore and in foreign currency 
by domestic companies to benefit from lower 
interest rates and the stable peso - $2,000 to 
$4,000 million.
Certainly, some of this total pre-dates 1989 and 
perhaps $8,000 to $10,000 million is normal and 
stable - until there is a crisis of confidence. But even 
a hiccup in confidence would cut net inflows leading 
to a payment crisis, rapid downward float (or sink) of 
the peso, increasingly frantic attempts to claw back 
existing loans/property investments and full scale 
external account, exchange rate, property and fi­
nancial sector crises.
The near inevitability of such a hiccup sooner or 
later - and probably sooner, e.g. late 1992 or 1993 
- is hard to deny. The property boom appears to be 
well into the speculative bubble/overbuilding stage 
(like its late lamented relatives in the USA, UK, 
Japan and Australia). Up to $500 million a year of 
labour, goodsand services sales to US bases will be 
gone by the end of 1993. There are few signs that 
conversion of Subic will immediately generate sub­
stantial manufacturing or of John Hay, substantial 
tourist export earnings. Remittances are unlikely to 
continue to rise fast and may fall. The maritime 
trades are in secular decline. Whatever else it may
be, 1997 is a death sentence date for non-Chinese 
household help in Hong Kong. The Middle East 
employment totals (especially in Kuwait) are un­
likely to regain 1990 levels. Increasing permanent 
emigration to the USA, Australia and Canada will 
generate lower remittances (and balikbayan tourist 
earnings) than single, contract workers. Tourism 
and exports of goods (traditional or non-traditional) 
are hampered by high levels of currency overvalu­
ation while investment in domestic market-oriented 
production no longer protected by quantitative re­
strictions will be rendered unattractive by low growth 
and high overvaluation. Sky-high real interest rates 
may delay the external flow of funds crisis. But by 
structurally weakening the domestic economy (and 
possibly precipitating real estate and financial sec­
tor crises) such will also deepen the crisis when it 
comes.
The present policies in the present context add up 
to walking on thin ice (more accurately tepid water) 
on Manila Bay. One need not be overly devout nor 
particularly skeptical to doubt whether Secretary 
Jesus Estanislao, his colleagues and his succes­
sors will be able to duplicate his namesake’s miracle 
of walking on the storm-tossed waters of the Sea of 
Galilee. That conclusion is very much of the real 
world and of the history of comparable efforts.
Who Has Benefited (and 
Paid)? Who Will Be Hurt?
Actual economic strategies are rarely adopted 
and still more rarely pursued for long unless some 
key economic interests believe they benefit from 
them and the losers either do not recognise the 
costs or are powerless to reverse the strategy.
The Makati financial and property development 
community clearly believed - correctly in the short 
run - that high stable exchange rates, high real 
interest rates plus high spreads between deposit 
and lending rates with profits underwritten by high 
Treasury bill rates are good for them. They can be
said to be myopic but bankers and property devel­
opers very often are.
The Philippine manufacturing/landlord sector has 
a historic aversion to devaluation. It also appears to 
have an implicit understanding that in return for 
industry opposing meaningful land reform, the land­
lord influence will be delivered for high protection. It 
therefore appears to have - with limited exceptions 
- failed to note that overvaluation and high real 
interest rates plus trade liberalisation are very bad 
for exporters, producers competing with imports 
and net borrowers. Furthermore, manufacturers 
were not able to prevent massive dismantling of 
protection.
Organised (and even more the unorganised) la­
bour and peasants have lost out under the present 
economic strategy - no real land reform, falling real 
wages, and reversal of 1986-87 moves to ‘level the 
playing field’ between workers and employers. They 
have been well aware of this. But since the depar­
ture from office of Secretary Sanchez and the 
Mendiola massacre, the Malacanang’s hardline 
stance against worker and peasant interests has 
been both evident and consistent. Therefore, there 
was little they could do to reverse the strategy or 
even secure significant cushioning from its worst 
effects on them.
In one sense everyone - or almost everyone - will 
lose if the bubble bursts without either preliminary 
partial deflation or a clear-cut, practicable damage- 
containment and revival-promotion strategy. Rap­
idly falling exchange rates fuel inflation and rising 
interest rates promptly feedback to create a vicious 
and possibly accelerating downward spiral.
Debtors - especially non-property or financial 
enterprises and landlords - will benefit or lose de­
pending on whether their debts are peso or external 
currency denominated. If the former, they will gain 
from inflation; if the latter, they may well be crushed 
by devaluation. Exporters, not least landlords, should 
benefit unambiguously. Unless the economy goes 
into sustained hyperinflation, they will gain more on
the devaluation boost to peso earnings than they 
will lose on inflationary boosting of peso costs. For 
domestic market competition with imports, the re­
sults are more ambiguous. General economic de­
pression and loss of confidence may well hurt them 
more than the enhanced protection provided by 
devaluation.
Property developers - especially if they have 
borrowed in foreign currency - will be hard hit by the 
end of the real estate boom. On the record else­
where over 1989-91, many will go bankrupt with 
chain effects on linked companies including banks. 
Banks will be in danger of collapse if they have 
significant net foreign liabilities or domestic property 
sector loan assets. Otherwise they will probably 
enter a sticky patch but no worse.
Peasants and workers will lose for three reasons:
o with the present tilted negotiating field, high 
inflation will lead to falling real wages;
o government efforts to reduce the fiscal deficit 
- an ineffective means of damping inflation 
generated by spiralling devaluation and a hor­
rific step to take in the context of a probably 
severe depression will further erode the al­
ready eroding levels of real public services, 
rural infrastructure and funding for land reform; 
and
o the political economy of power in the Philip­
pines is skewed against workers and peasants 
(both of whom have had falling real income 
trends for thirty years) so that any shock is 
likely (almost certain) to worsen their position.
A Fiscal Aside
One school of thought blames problems on un­
sound fiscal policy and argues that until taxes are 
raised, high real interest rates are the only way to 
avert spiralling inflation.
This line of argument is basically ill-conceived for 
six reasons:
1. Treasury bill rates are often 5 percent above 
inflation plus deposit rates, underwriting both 
bank profits and the attractiveness of lending to 
Filipino borrowers for any enterprise whose 
own inflation rates and capital costs are much 
lower;
2. A 3to 5 percent of GDP government borrowing 
requirement is neither unsound nor unsustain­
able if adequate human and infrastructural 
investment is taking place - vide Malaysia and, 
until the late 1980s, Korea;
3. High interest rates and failure to secure ‘going 
terms’ external debt servicing burden reduc­
tions are the basic cause of the present deficit;
4. Tax collection (which is arguably only 50 per­
cent of amounts actually due across a wide 
range of direct and indirect taxes) and the 
absence of meaningful progressive land taxes 
- not low tax rates - is the basic constraint on 
revenue. Increasing complexity of rates and 
broadened coverage for VAT (in itself an ill- 
chosen general indirect tax as opposed to a 
reformed - and enforced - single point of entry 
or manufacture sales tax) are a misdirection of 
energy and will do far less for revenue than 
enhanced collection;
5. Expenditure - notably on health, education, 
infrastructure and rural transformation (includ­
ing but not limited to land reform) - is fartoo low. 
The Philippines over 30 years has gone from 
near the top of the Asian league table in terms 
of percent of GDP allocated via the budget on 
health and education, in quality and quantity of 
infrastructure (and on real wages and labour 
productivity) to near the bottom. Its present 
peers are not Korea-Taiwan nor Thailand-Ma- 
laysia but Vietnam-Cambodia-Afghanistan;
6. To cure 5 above requires more expenditure. 
To finance it requires both more effective tax
collection (and reforming indirect taxes with a 
view to collectability) and reducing interest 
payments through external debt service reduc­
tions and lower domestic interest rates. To 
sustain such a transformation trend, GDP 
growth must be pushed to 4 to 5 percent a year 
concentrated on tradables.
The neo-Southern Cone strategy contributes noth­
ing to such a transformation. High interest rates and 
currency overvaluation deter investment, reduce 
manufacturing and agricultural sector profits, fur­
ther depress real wages (and labour productivity; 
thus, quite possibly raising even real peso labour 
cost per unit of output) and choke off growth. They 
are one of the basic causes of the fiscal crisis (the 
other being the administrative ineptitude and politi­
cal power barriers to effective tax collection) and no 
part of its solution.
But... Inflation?
Inflation is a problem. However, the question is 
what isf uelling it in the conditions of near stagnation 
of basic domestic earned purchasing power which 
have characterised the last 24 months.
High interest rates’ direct effect is to reinforce 
inflation. They are entered into markup'price cost 
structures. Only if they also constrict total spending 
will their net effect be to reduce it and then usually 
at the price of substantial and sustained recession 
- as in Australia and the United Kingdom.
Massive short term foreign credit or specula­
tive investment receipts - sucked in by the high 
interest rates - blunt the macroeconomic inflation- 
reducing impact of high real interest rates but not 
their recessionary impact on basic fixed investment 
and output.
External shocks - e.g. oil in 1989/90, drought in 
1991/92 - and bottlenecks - e.g. electric power in 
1991/92 - are both inflationary and output damag­
ing. In no conceivable way can high real interest 
rates be central to mitigating either impact.
Mini booms (or bubbles?) - notably in construc­
tion - are highly inflationary, e.g. the UK and Japan 
in the late 1980s. So long as the belief in ever-rising 
property prices and rents persists, they are self- 
generating despite high real interest rates espe­
cially when de facto (now de jure) free currency 
convertibility at a rate expected to be stable makes 
them attractive to external finance.
Fiscal management (as noted above) does re­
sult in some government borrowing pressure on 
prices although by itself this is clearly secondary 
and manageable at 3 to 5 percent of GDP borrowing 
requirements especially if a substantial portion are 
soft external loan financed.
In short, much of the inflation is caused by the 
strategy and little, if any, can be cured within the 
neo-Southern Cone parameters. A squeeze hard 
enough to lower inflation to 5 percent would destroy 
investor - and speculator - confidence, burst the 
building bubble - littering the three largest cities with 
mini-Canary Wharfs - and trigger a rush out of the 
peso.
What Is To Be Done?
The basic question to be addressed is how to get 
the Philippine economy and people out of the eco­
nomic coffin which the Makati-Malacanang-Luisita 
axis of power has so elegantly, even if ab- 
sentmindedly, crafted. That is a matter both of 
urgency and of difficulty - bubbles are hard to deflate 
softly, they tend to burst at the first prick.
To limit damage, initial action needs to be across 
the board, prompt and adequate to give some 
assurance it will stick. Long hesitation, minor piece­
meal changes and growing uncertainty will trigger a 
cut off of new inflows, a withdrawal of new normal 
90- to 180-day commercial credit and quite possibly 
substantial demands for cutting inter-company and
other open book balance claims while the remitting 
is still good. The first two could exhaust reserves in 
two to three months. At its most extreme, all three 
could do it in two to three days.
The key elements and alternatives are evident:
1. devaluation - either by at least 50 percent (to 
peso 39-40 to the dollar) followed by a free float with 
only limited smoothing or successive 10 percent 
monthly devaluations to peso 40 to 50 to the dollar 
backed by exchange controls.
o The first would have a faster positive effect on 
output of tradables and of manufacturing and 
agricultural enterprise profits but would run 
greater risk of deteriorating into a devaluation/ 
price rise downward spiral. That risk would be 
even greater if 25 percent were the initial 
devaluation which, as on sober re-examina­
tion, few analysts would expect it to stick;
o The second might or might not reduce unin­
tended side effects. However, as the end goal 
of peso 40 to peso 50 to the dollar could be 
intuited and cutting off continued commercial 
credit will swamp exchange control dykes in a 
few months, caution may no longer be prudent. 
The basic lesson is to avoid inadvertently mov­
ing to 100 percent overvaluation.
2. Further, reduction of ta riffs  is needed to 
mitigate the inflationary impact. Import-substitution 
industries can afford to make such a contribution at 
much more favourable exchange rates anyway. For 
revenue purposes, taxes broadly equivalent to tar­
iffs might be imposed on both domestic producers 
and on importers - perhaps as the first step to a 
multiple (perhaps five plus alcohol, tobacco and 
fuel) rate, semi-progressive single point sales tax to 
replace VAT.
3. Possible use of the balance in the petroleum 
stabilization fund to phase the impact of higher fuel 
costs. However, this might not work as it would be 
expected to be temporary, (or might be the road to
10
permanent fuel subsidies) so requires reflection.
4. Immediate inauguration of across the board 
re-negotiations aimed at a Brady plus 60 percent 
reduction in government-to-government and 
commercial external debt service (with flexibility
as to means of achieving it).
o Suspension of payments on principal for the 
negotiating period would probably be prudent 
except for revolving commercial credit;
o Repudiation of the Bataan agreement on the 
basis that the lenders knew or ought to have 
known that fraud went to the heart of the basic 
contract (especially as completing a nuclear 
reactor beneath the ash plume of Pinatubo in 
an active volcanic zone is an act of madness 
and a gratuitous waste of resources).
o The debt cap bill should be reviewed, re­
passed and signed to bolster the Philippine 
negotiators’ position. However, exclusion of 
revolving commercial credits, making the 10 
percent cap net, not gross, and applying it to all 
foreign exchange earnings would be prudent.
5. Nominal interest rates should be held con­
stant (even if initial inflation after devaluation makes 
them negative in real terms) and reduced after 
inflation falls with a target of not over 5 percent real 
on basic commercial bank lending rates.
6. The government should not take the em­
ployer's side in wage negotiations. Philippine 
real wages are already too low in terms of achieving 
a dynamic of rising labour productivity and falling 
labour cost per unit of output. Certainly the initial 
results of policy change will be a further fall but the 
government should not seek to maximise it. Com­
pulsory, binding, independent arbitration might be a 
useful interim initiative although whether it could be 
pushed through Congress promptly is problematic.
7. Viable enterprises caught by devaluation 4. 
losses and/or loss of external credit should be given
access to short-term emergency finance (at normal 
interest rates) while financial stabilisation or recon­
struction is sorted out. This is especially true if main 
line financial institutions are heavily compromised 
(as may not be the case). This is not a case for 
bailing out shareholders but large-scale collapses 
(e.g. of groups with heavy property and construction 
exposure) could lead to a deeply damaging down­
ward spiral. In no case should the government 
“nationalise" unserviceable private sector obliga­
tions - let the external lenders share the losses.
These measures will neither be popular nor avoid 
very considerable pain. But the pain involved in 
allowing the bubble to expand further, desperately 
trying to sustain it and ending with an unplanned 
collapse when external confidence vanishes, would 
be far worse. Nor would that route provide any clear 
base for reconstruction.
Longer-term strategic measures needing imme­
diate canvassing for early initiation and medium- 
term payoff include:
1. Fiscal reform concentrating on restoring health, 
education and infrastructure budgets to ade­
quate levels relative to present coverage and to 
GDP over a 5- to 7-year period;
2. Financing of 1 above by improving revenue 
collection (administration, probity, resistance 
to special interests), simplifying indirect taxes 
and introducing progressive property taxes on 
independent (not taxpayer provided) valuation 
as well as by external debt service reduction 
and lower real interest rates;
3. Focussing policy on means to creating an 
enabling environment for sustained, rapid 
growth of labour productivity including but not 
necessarily limited to more adequate human 
and infrastructural investment (not least break­
ing the power bottleneck) and a trend rise in 
real wages per day;
Substantial genuine land reform backed by 
enabling measures (not including crippling re-
payment burdens) for new family farming 
households and paralleled by serious attempts 
to achieve reforestation of some and conver­
sion to agriculture of other substantial hec- 
tarages of present nominal forest lands (which 
are in fact slash-and-burn or abandoned bush 
disaster zones); and
5. Strengthening the domestic market growth 
base for economic expansion - including but 
not limited to the broad base purchasing power 
expansion resulting from higher real wages 
and land reform.
These measures - contrary to popular mispercep­
tion - are all consonant with much of 1960s and 
1970s Korean and Taiwanese economic policy that 
the 1986-91 - and a fortiori 1989-91 - economic 
policy of the Philippines. While not cast as an 
absolute poverty reduction strategy, these would - 
if successful - be much more effective than mar­
ginal, small ‘target’ group poverty palliation proj­
ects. They would raise wage and small farm real 
incomes and - by enhanced growth and lower unit 
labour costs from productivity growth - employment 
opportunities. When 40 to 60 percent of households 
are absolutely poor, it is only by enabling poor 
people to produce and to earn more can there be 
substantial, sustained transformation to decent in­
comes for (almost) all.
One aspect of Korean and Taiwanese policy is 
deliberately not proposed - detailed state involve­
ment in credit, licence and other allocations flowing 
from an economic strategy framework. The Philip­
pines public service does not have the experience, 
the skills, nor the independent professional judg­
ment and probity to make that a prudent 1992 
Philippine prescription.
The initial steps may in large measure be attain­
able if the case for them is made out promptly and 
pushed at all levels from advice to decision-makers 
to popular organisations. While many senators and 
representatives are holdovers, Congress had little 
impact on broad economic policy, and while the
incoming President was certainly prominent in Presi­
dent Aquino’s administration, he had no known 
involvement in economic policy.
The medium-term measures are more problem­
atic. Each will clearly be opposed by particular 
interest groups well represented in the House and in 
traditional advisers and advice-bearers to Mala- 
canang. Asa whole, they could make progress only 
with full Presidential (and key Secretary) commit­
ment and willingness to confront most landlords, a 
large fraction of industrialists, property developers, 
Makati, external creditors and a majority in the 
House and probably in the Senate as well.
Such a political transformation at the top is pos­
sible and could make some progress - especially if 
it proved electorally popular. It would be entirely 
consistent with the Cry of Balintawak and the spirit 
of EDSA so prominently featured in the President­
elect’s launching manifesto. To that extent it may be 
in the real world.
Notes
'"Southern Cone” refers to the following countries 
forming the southern part of South America: 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.
